Why I Am a Christian

A Rebuttal to Bertrand Russell

Bertrand Russell’s famous lecture “Why I Am Not a Christian” (1927) lays out a clear, candid case for rejecting Christianity. In the same straightforward tone and structure, I will respond point-by-point, offering a different perspective. My approach is rooted in presuppositional apologetics, an argument that begins from the foundational assumptions (presuppositions) underlying worldviews. Following the insights of Cornelius Van Til and Greg Bahnsen, I contend that Russell’s criticisms actually rely on principles that only the Christian worldview can ultimately justify. In other words, I will argue that Christian theism provides the necessary foundation for the reason, morality, and meaning that even atheists value, thus refuting Russell on his own terms. This response is offered with respect for Russell’s intellect and for atheist readers’ sincerity. Let’s examine each of his main arguments in turn, mirroring the outline of Russell’s essay while presenting a robust Christian counter-case.

What Is a Christian?

Russell begins by defining what he means by “Christian.” He suggests that a Christian, at minimum, believes in God and immortality and also holds Jesus Christ in high esteem (either as divine or at least the best of men). In response, I affirm that Christianity is centered on certain core presuppositions: that an eternal, triune God exists; that He has revealed Himself authoritatively (in nature, Scripture, and supremely in Jesus Christ); and that salvation and eternal life come through Christ and His sovereign grace alone to all the elect. But beyond doctrinal points, being a Christian also means adopting a whole worldview, a basic framework for all thought, grounded in God’s reality and revelation. This is crucial, because my rebuttal will show that starting from the Christian worldview makes sense of things (like logic, science, and morals) in a way that Russell’s secular starting point cannot. In presuppositional terms,

I will argue that Christian presuppositions are the precondition for the intelligibility of the debate itself. With that understanding, let’s address Russell’s specific critiques of belief in God and Christianity.

The First Cause Argument (Cosmological Argument)

One of Russell’s first targets is the classic First Cause argument for God’s existence. In Russell’s summary, some Christians argue that “everything must have a cause, so the universe must have a cause, namely, God.” Russell counters: if everything needs a cause, why wouldn’t God need one too? And if something can exist without a cause, perhaps the universe itself is uncaused, making God unnecessary. He found this argument unconvincing and outdated.

Rebuttal: The First Cause argument in its simplistic form (“everything has a cause, so God is the cause of the universe”) is indeed flawed if misstated. A more precise formulation is that everything that begins to exist has a cause, and since the universe began to exist, it requires a transcendent cause (a causal agent outside the universe, not bound by the universe’s conditions). God, as traditionally understood, did not begin to exist; He is eternal and uncaused – the uncreated Creator. So the question “What caused God?” misunderstands the claim. The Christian view is that God is the ultimate reality, the necessary being who grounds all contingent existence. It’s not special pleading to exempt God from causality; it’s a recognition of a different category of existence (the eternal vs. the temporal).

From a presuppositional angle, however, there is an even deeper issue: causality itself only makes sense within a theistic worldview. Russell was using the principle of sufficient reason (that things need explanations) to challenge God’s existence, but consider: if the universe is just a brute fact with no ultimate reason, on what basis do we expect causal explanations at all? The uniformity of nature and the causal order of the cosmos are taken for granted by science and everyday reasoning. Yet if reality at root were a random, accidental flux, it’s hard to justify why cause and effect should be reliable or intelligible. The Christian presupposition is that a rational God created an orderly universe, that’s why causes produce consistent effects. On an atheistic presupposition, believing in universal, abstract laws of causation is an act of faith in an accidental cosmos. Thus, when Russell (or any of us) appeals to causal reasoning, we are borrowing capital from a worldview in which a logical Lawgiver underpins reality.

In summary, a Christian can agree with Russell that a naïve formulation of the First Cause argument is insufficient, we shouldn’t say “everything has a cause” without qualification. But the need for an ultimate cause or necessary being remains a strong point. Every worldview faces the question of why there is something rather than nothing. The Christian answer is that God’s eternal existence is the sufficient reason for everything else, whereas Russell’s naturalism ultimately must say the universe (or multiverse, or laws of physics) “just is.” To many, that is far less satisfying rationally. More importantly, only the existence of a self-existent Creator makes sense of why a principle like causality would hold in a coherent, universal way. Thus the First Cause, when refined and placed in a presuppositional context, still points reasonably to God rather than away from Him.

The Natural Law Argument

Russell next examined what he called the Natural Law argument, the idea that the regular laws of nature imply a divine Lawgiver. In his time, some Christians claimed that things like gravity or the orderly motions of planets showed God’s governance. Russell retorted that “natural laws” are just descriptive; they don’t require a legislator any more than the habits of animals do. He also noted that modern science has undermined a strictly deterministic picture – for example, quantum physics introduces unpredictability, so the universe doesn’t look like a clockwork set by God. To Russell, invoking God to explain natural order was unnecessary.

Rebuttal: It is true that science describes how things behave. But presuppositional apologetics asks a deeper question: why is nature law-like at all? Why is mathematics applicable to the physical world? Why can our minds discern orderly patterns and laws in nature? The Christian answer is that a rational God created both the world and our minds, in His image, to comprehend it. There is a fundamental universal rationality undergirding the laws of physics, they are consistent, mathematically describable, and uniform through time and space – which reflects the mind of a Lawgiver. In contrast, if the universe is ultimately a product of blind chance, it is surprising that it operates with such regularity and intelligibility. As one philosopher famously pointed out, it’s something of a miracle that complex physics can be summarized in elegant laws, an “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” in describing nature.

Russell might respond that we simply observe regularities and that’s that. But this is where presuppositions matter. He assumes the universe has an intelligible order that the human mind can grasp – an assumption that makes perfect sense if the universe is the creation of a logical God who made our minds to correspond to His creation. That assumption makes less sense if our cognitive faculties are just the byproduct of mindless evolution aimed at survival rather than truth. (Even Charles Darwin once admitted a “horrible doubt” about whether a mind evolved from lower animals could be fully trustworthy for discerning truth.) In short, the very concept of natural law presupposes a cosmic lawgiver or at least a rational source.

While quantum indeterminacy shows nature isn’t mechanistically determined in every detail, even quantum physics follows elegant probabilistic laws. The issue isn’t whether nature has some randomness or not; it’s that nature operates in accord with consistent principles at all, from gravity to quantum wavefunctions. A believer sees God’s faithful upholding of creation behind this consistency. An atheist like Russell enjoys the benefit of nature’s order but, on a secular worldview, can offer no ultimate reason why reality shouldn’t be chaotic or why the human mind should succeed in mapping that order. The Christian worldview uniquely guarantees the preconditions for science: an orderly universe and reliable human rationality. In this way, the natural law argument, when framed presuppositionally, still strongly supports theism. God is not invoked as a gap-filler for this or that phenomenon, but as the foundational reason we have a coherent, law-governed cosmos at all.

The Argument from Design

Closely related is the Argument from Design. Russell addressed the classic notion that the complexity and purposefulness in the world (especially in living things) indicate a Designer. He noted that biology had explained much apparent design through Darwinian evolution, and he famously quipped that the world, if designed, isn’t particularly well-designed (pointing to suffering and imperfections). In Russell’s eyes, the evidence of nature did not unmistakably point to an omnipotent, benevolent Designer.

Rebuttal: The design argument has evolved (no pun intended) since Russell’s day. It’s true that natural selection accounts for some biological complexity, but it doesn’t eliminate deeper questions of design, it arguably redirects them. We now know that life is undergirded by intricate information encoded in DNA, by molecular machines in cells, and by finely tuned biochemical processes. We also know that the physical constants of the universe (forces, particle masses, etc.) fall in an astoundingly narrow range that permits the existence of atoms, stars, planets, and life. These facts have led even some secular scientists to speak of the universe as “fine-tuned” for life, it’s as if the cosmos knew we were coming. While this doesn’t prove God in a mathematical sense, it cries out for an explanation beyond chance. Design proponents argue that mindless processes alone are hugely unlikely to produce the specified complexity and delicate balances we observe.

Presuppositionally, though, let’s consider design in a broader way. The very concept of “order” or “purpose” is meaningful only if our worldview provides a source of objective meaning. If atheism is true, ultimately the universe has no purpose – it wasn’t made for anything. Human minds, which seek purpose, would themselves just be purposeless byproducts of nature. In such a view, saying something looks “designed” might simply be a quirk of our pattern-seeking brains. The Christian worldview, by contrast, expects real design: we believe a rational God made the world with intent. We thus have grounds to trust that when reality appears purposeful and ordered, this appearance is no illusion, it reflects an actual Mind behind nature.

Russell raises the issue of flaws and evils in the world as counter-evidence to a perfect Designer. This is a significant concern (the problem of evil, which we’ll address later). But note that recognizing something as a “flaw” or “evil” itself presupposes an idea of how things ought to be, an objective standard of goodness or optimal design. By what standard can we call natural suffering or ugliness a bad design, unless we are measuring against some ideal? If the world were truly random at root, we’d have no basis to label any state of it as wrong or right. Christian theism provides both a standard of goodness (rooted in God’s character) and an explanation that a good creation has been marred by free creatures (human sin, and even nature “groaning” under the curse, as the Bible says). That is why not everything now is optimally designed – yet we still see abundant evidence of original design.

In sum, the design argument, when purged of overly simplistic forms, remains powerful. The intricate intelligibility and fine-tuning of the universe point to a Designer. And only a worldview where mind precedes matter can consistently explain why the world is so replete with rational order and beauty. Russell’s worldview must treat these as happy coincidences; the Christian worldview sees them as signatures of God.

The Moral Argument and the Problem of Justice

Russell went on to discuss moral arguments for God, for instance, the claim that without God there would be no right or wrong, or that we need God to ensure ultimate justice (so that good is rewarded and evil punished in the end). He rejected these arguments, asserting that one can be moral without believing in God and that unjust suffering in the world is evidence against a righteous deity rather than for one.

Rebuttal: This is a crucial point, and it requires care. It’s certainly true that atheists and agnostics can live morally admirable lives. Russell himself was a passionate moralist on issues like war and freedom. The question is not whether nonbelievers can know or do good, clearly they can and do. The question is what grounds the very concepts of “good” and “evil,” “right” and “wrong.” If the universe is, at bottom, impersonal and indifferent, consisting only of matter and energy, where do binding moral values come from? Are they mere human conventions, feelings ingrained by evolution for survival? If so, then morality has no objective force, it’s just a description of what we happen to approve of, which could have been otherwise. Russell, as a secular humanist, believed we can formulate ethics based on human needs and empathy. But why should human needs oblige anyone to care, beyond pragmatic or emotional reasons?

From a presuppositional standpoint, the very reality of moral duty and human dignity presupposes a moral Lawgiver and a design in which humans have inherent worth. Christianity teaches that moral laws are rooted in God’s holy nature and that humans are valuable because we bear God’s image. Thus, when we say cruelty is objectively wrong, we are aligning with the fact that a just God created a moral order. Russell can personally abhor cruelty (as he did); he can advocate for virtue. But on what objective authority? If morality is just a happenstance product of evolution or culture, then it holds no ultimate authority over us, one culture’s “right” could be another’s “wrong” with no higher court of appeal. In contrast, if God is real, moral values have an objective, unchanging reference point. Ironically, Russell’s vigorous moral critiques of religion (“the Church did this or that wrong”) carry weight only if there is a real moral standard by which to judge wrong. Otherwise, those become mere preferences or social disagreements.

Consider also the argument about justice. Russell thought the unfairness of life – good people suffering, evil people prospering, was just evidence against a just God. A Christian sees the same injustice and is troubled by it too, but within our worldview this fuels hope in God, not disbelief. Why? Because if God exists, there is the promise of ultimate justice, an afterlife where accounts are settled, where evil is punished and tears wiped away. If God does not exist, then the atrocities of history (murdered children, genocidal tyrants dying peacefully in bed) will never be put right. The hunger for justice that we feel would be a tragic illusion. Russell might accept that as the price of reality, but the question remains: why do we hunger for justice at all? Why do we feel that moral accounts ought to be balanced? Christianity says this is because the moral law is real and written on our hearts by the Creator. We intuitively know that evil deserves retribution and goodness deserves reward, even if in this life that doesn’t always happen. Our intuition makes perfect sense if a just God made us; it is merely a quirk of neural chemistry if not.

So while Russell is correct that one can formulate a kind of secular ethics, I maintain that such an ethic lacks a sound foundation. The existence of objective moral values and our deep-seated conviction that justice matters both point to God. In fact, as presuppositionalists observe, Russell uses moral arguments (against Christianity’s track record, against the idea of hell, etc.) throughout his essay, thus he leans on an objective moral standard while simultaneously denying the very source that could make it binding. This tension is resolved by acknowledging God as the source of morality.

The Character of Christ and “Defects” in His Teaching

Russell did not consider Jesus the best or wisest of men, contrary to what many Christians claim. He admired some of Christ’s teachings (like kindness and forgiveness) but also found “defects.” Specifically, Russell objected to Jesus’ belief in hell and judgment (“threatening people with eternal punishment,” which Russell saw as morally reprehensible) and what he interpreted as Christ’s apocalyptic urgency (expecting the world’s end in his generation, which Russell deemed a mistake). These points led Russell to doubt either Christ’s wisdom or the accuracy of the Gospels.

Rebuttal: One’s view of Jesus is enormously influenced by one’s starting points. If one presupposes a humanistic framework where anything like eternal judgment is automatically seen as cruel, then of course Jesus’ warnings about hell will seem like a “defect.” But let’s step back. If we grant for the sake of argument the Christian presuppositions, that God is perfectly good and just, that human sin is real and serious, and that there is an eternal dimension to life, then Jesus’ teaching about hell is not cruelty but truth in love. He spoke about hell as a sober warning precisely because, on Christianity, it is the just consequence of rejecting God’s grace. One may dislike the idea (even Christians struggle with it emotionally), but if it’s true, then warning people is an act of compassion. Russell assumed that hell, if real, would make God a monster; Christianity holds that hell is the freely chosen end of those who refuse ultimate Goodness (C.S. Lewis once remarked that in the end there are those who say to God “Thy will be done” and those to whom God says “thy will be done,” allowing them to separate from Him forever). The doctrine of judgment underscores human responsibility and the moral seriousness of life. It’s not pleasant, but a world without ultimate justice (as in atheism) is in many ways more bleak, it means tyrants and abusers truly get away with it if they die unpunished. In the Christian view, no one ultimately “gets away with it.” There will be accountability, which is what many of us desire at a deep level for the world to be set right.

As for Christ’s supposed error about the timing of the end of the world: this is a matter of interpretation. Partial Preterist theologians argue accurately that Jesus’ statements about “this generation will not pass until…” referred to the fall of Jerusalem (which did occur within a generation of his listeners), not the end of the world itself. Others note that Jesus said plainly that no one knows the exact hour of the end. Regardless, consider the moral and spiritual genius of Christ’s life and teachings: even many skeptics admire Jesus as an ethical figure. Where did this wisdom come from? Jesus taught radical forgiveness, love of enemies, the golden rule, care for the least of these – ideals that have inspired billions. Russell cherry-picked a few hard sayings, but on balance, Christ’s character as presented in the Gospels is remarkably consistent, compassionate, and free of the usual vices that plague even great men. He lived what he taught without hypocrisy.

If Jesus is who Christians claim (God incarnate), then his moral judgments carry absolute authority. Russell essentially set himself up as morally superior to Christ by judging Christ’s teaching. This is a bold stance: it implies Russell was in a position to know more about righteousness than Jesus did. On what basis? Russell’s own 20th-century liberal ethics? As argued, without an objective moral standard, such judgments become subjective. But if Jesus is the very standard (being God in flesh), then Russell’s critique fails by definition. Of course, that’s only persuasive if one accepts Jesus’s divinity – which Russell didn’t. Yet one must wonder: by what moral measuring stick did Russell conclude that teaching about hell is worse than, say, not teaching about it if it’s true? Russell appeals implicitly to values like mercy and kindness (which he thinks the idea of hell violates). Christianity too values mercy and kindness, these make sense as reflections of God’s nature. But Christianity also values holiness and justice. The tension between mercy and justice is resolved at the Cross in Christian theology (where Jesus bore judgment to offer mercy). Remove the Christian framework, and those values have no anchor.

In the end, whether Christ had “defects” depends on one’s framework. Russell, assuming there is no God and no judgment, found Christ’s emphasis on them to be a defect. From within a Christian framework, Christ’s teachings (even the uncomfortable ones) are truthful and necessary. One may certainly examine historical evidence for Jesus’s resurrection and divinity, evidential apologetics complements presuppositional by confirming that our presuppositions are not blind. If Jesus rose from the dead, for instance, that validates His claims. Russell did not address that directly, but it’s worth noting: a lot hinges on Jesus’s identity. I maintain that Christ is not just a moral teacher but Lord, and thus his teachings on morality, judgment, and salvation are authoritative. Any “defect” perceived is a defect in our understanding or in our acceptance of hard truths, rather than in Christ Himself.

Christianity, Science, and the Emotional Factor

Russell concluded by attributing people’s religiosity largely to emotion, especially fear. He famously wrote that religion is based “primarily on fear… fear of the unknown, fear of death” and on the desire for security. He urged humans to set aside these fears and bravely use reason and science to improve the world, rather than clinging to dogmas. Religion, in his view, impeded progress and was often aligned with oppression .

Rebuttal: There is no denying that fear and hope in the face of mortality can motivate religious belief. Christianity itself acknowledges human fears of death, of meaninglessness, and offers an answer in the form of Christ’s victory over death and the promise of eternal life. But to reduce all faith to mere fear is an unfair oversimplification. For many thoughtful Christians, the motivation for belief is not craven fear or wishful thinking but a genuine conviction that Christianity is true, logically, historically, and experientially. Presuppositional apologetics would add that even Russell’s confidence in reason and science betrays a kind of faith, a faith in the reliability of the human mind and the uniformity of nature, which, as argued, are justified by the Christian worldview, not a secular one.

Russell championed science and reason (as do I!), but he seemed to think they stand in opposition to faith. In reality, modern science was largely birthed in the matrix of Christian theism, early scientists believed in a rational Creator, which inspired the search for rational laws in nature. Far from impeding knowledge, the Christian outlook provided the philosophical basis for expecting an intelligible world . It is worth noting that Russell’s own epistemology (he was an empiricist) cannot itself be proved empirically, it’s a philosophical stance. He had faith in human reason’s power, yet reason works properly (we argue) only because we live in a cosmos designed for minds to comprehend. Thus, when Russell urges an evidence-based, courageous mindset, he is ironically leaning on virtues and assumptions that Christianity underwrites. Always remember that "science" does not say anything, scientists do, and the worldview of the scientist will inform his interpretation of all evidence.

What about the charge that religion is propagated by fear (fear of hell, etc.) and that it causes wars and oppression? History is mixed: religious institutions have indeed been involved in atrocities, which Christians should honestly acknowledge. But humans find reasons to fight and oppress with or without religion (political ideologies, ethnic hatred, etc., have done as much or worse in secular regimes). The question is not whether misuse of religion has had bad effects (it has at times, just as science misused, e.g. in eugenics, has harmful effects), but whether Christianity’s core teachings, if followed, lead to fear and cruelty or to hope and love. I would argue the latter: the core of the faith is that “perfect love drives out fear,” that we are not to be governed by fear of anything (except a reverence for God, which is the beginning of wisdom). The New Testament repeatedly tells believers “Do not be afraid.” So if fear is operative, it is a distortion, not the heart, of Christian motivation.

Russell thought freeing oneself from religion would produce a braver, better world. Yet consider what a truly consistent atheism entails emotionally: We are accidents in a cold universe, our destinies annihilation; any meaning or morality is one we invent temporarily. Some may find that bracing; many find it deeply disheartening or indeed terrifying. It’s not obvious that secularism eliminates existential fear, arguably, it might increase it (fear of oblivion, or of life’s ultimate futility). The Christian worldview, when embraced, replaces those fears with hope and purpose. The courage Russell wants, to face reality honestly, is actually encouraged within Christianity: face the reality of our moral brokenness, the reality of death, but also the reality of God’s grace that overcomes these.

Lastly, on progress: Christianity, for all its historical entanglements with power, also inspired progress, the development of universities, the idea of human rights (because all are made in God’s image), the abolition of slavery (many abolitionists were devout Christians appealing to Christian ethics). Russell’s claim that religion impedesknowledge and is “largely harmful” is an overstatement . Yes, dogmatism and superstition have done harm (and Christians must continually reform their practice by returning to the true principles of Christ). But the solution to bad religion is not no religion, but true religion rightly applied. A worldview vacuum often gets filled with other dogmas (political cults of personality, etc.) with their own harms. The real issue is the human heart, which Christianity diagnoses as sinful and in need of redemption. Russell pinned blame on religion itself, whereas Christianity pins blame on sin (which can corrupt both religious and secular institutions). The remedy Christianity offers is spiritual transformation of individuals toward love, which in turn would ameliorate the ills Russell feared.

Conclusion: Choosing the Right Foundation

Point by point, we have seen a pattern: Bertrand Russell’s arguments against Christianity often borrow elements (logic, morality, a value for truth) that make sense only if the Christian worldview is true. This is the crux of the presuppositional rebuttal. Rather than meeting each of Russell’s critiques only on an external evidential level, I have tried to show that his very ability to critique relies on standards and assumptions best grounded in the existence of the Christian God.

• He questions the First Cause, but the intelligibility of causation itself comes from a world of order created by God.

• He dismisses divine design, yet the remarkable order and rationality of the cosmos reflect a designing Mind, and even his confidence in scientific laws presupposes such a Mind.

• He upholds moral ideals while rejecting God, yet objective moral values and human rights derive from a transcendent moral Lawgiver – without which they become subjective.

• He faults Christ’s teachings using moral reasoning that, unwittingly, draws on Judeo-Christian moral capital (the very ideas of love, justice, etc., that have shaped our conscience).

• He extols reason and humanitarian progress, yet reason’s trustworthiness and the intrinsic worth of humans are secure only if we are made by a rational, loving God, not if we are cosmic accidents.

In a final assessment, why am I a Christian? Not because I fear the dark or seek a cosmic security blanket, but because I am convinced that Christianity is true, that it provides the most coherent and satisfying foundation for all aspects of life: intellectual, moral, and existential. It addresses the whole of reality: the origin and fine-tuning of the universe, the depth of human evil and greatness, our longing for meaning, and the historical evidence of God’s intervention in Jesus Christ. Far from requiring us to shelve our brains, Christianity dares us to “love God with all our mind,” providing a worldview in which mind, heart, and soul can find harmony. All of this is entirely due to the sovereign grace of the trinity without which, it is impossible to believe the gospel.

Russell challenged people to stand on their own two feet and look the cold universe in the face. I challenge readers to consider that the universe is not cold after all intervention it is the creation of a personal God who can be known. Facing reality with courage is indeed vital; the question is what is the ultimate reality? If the ultimate reality is God, then acknowledging Him is not a retreat into fear, but a step into the light of truth.

In closing, I echo Russell’s call for honest inquiry but redirect it: Examine not only Christianity’s claims with skepticism, but also scrutinize the assumptions of skepticism itself. You may find that rejecting belief in God undermines the very tools you use to reject Him. And you may find, as I have, that Christian faith answers the deepest cries of reason and the human spirit, not by suppressing questions or fears, but by fulfilling them in the person of Jesus Christ – who is “the way, the truth, and the life.”

Let us, then, pursue truth courageously wherever it leads. I have argued it leads not away from Christ, but directly to Him. He alone must open the heart and mind to the gospel, and He uses ordinary Christians who are willing to share His word and answer any and all objections to the truth.

And that is why I am a Christian.

Sources:

• Russell, Bertrand. Why I Am Not a Christian, 1927. (Critical summary of Russell’s arguments)

• Russell’s view that religion is founded on fear and is harmful .

• The Bible (various references) – for presuppositions about God as Creator, moral lawgiver, and the basis for truth and reason (e.g. Genesis 1:1; John 1:1-3; Romans 1:19-20; Proverbs 1:7).

• Van Til, Cornelius. The Defense of the Faith. (Foundational work on presuppositional apologetics, arguing that all reasoning assumes God)

• Bahnsen, Greg. Always Ready and debate transcripts (e.g. Bahnsen–Stein debate, 1985), where the transcendental argument (“the impossibility of the contrary”) is employed.

• Discussions on fine-tuning in physics (various authors acknowledging the appearance of design in cosmology).

• Historical evidence for Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection (as explored by scholars like N.T. Wright, Gary Habermas), providing an evidential complement to the presuppositional case.