Refuting Atheism Presuppositionally: A Van Tilian Apologetic

Introduction

Modern atheism poses a seemingly formidable intellectual challenge to Christian theism. From Friedrich Nietzsche’s thunderous proclamation of the “death of God” to the scientistic polemics of Richard Dawkins, atheistic thinkers have sought to dethrone the divine and place man or matter at the center of reality. Trained theologians and philosophers confront not only the arguments of New Atheism (Dawkins, Hitchens, and others), but also the deeper currents of existential atheism (Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus), materialism (ancient atomists to contemporary naturalists), and Marxist atheism (Karl Marx and his ideological heirs). How should Christians answer these varied critiques? This essay offers a presuppositional refutation of atheism, drawing on Cornelius Van Til’s transcendental apologetic method. Van Til’s approach does not merely counter individual evidences but challenges the very worldview foundations of unbelief, arguing that without the Christian God, one cannot mak thing — an argument from the “impossibility of the contrary.” In what follows, we will articulate Van Til’s presuppositional method and then engage representative atheistic thinkers (Nietzsche, Marx, Bertrand Russell, and Dawkins) and schools of thought (existential, Marxist, materialist, and New Atheism). Through careful analysis, it will be shown that atheism in all its forms collapses into self-contradiction or unlivable nihilism, whereas Christian theism alone provides the necessary preconditions for reason, morality, and meaning. The tone of this examination is scholarly and rigorous, yet rooted in the conviction of Scripture and the historic Christian faith (as summarized, for example, in the 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith). The goal is not ad hominem rhetoric but a serious intellectual rebuttal: demonstrating that atheism is ultimately “folly” and that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge” (Proverbs 1:7).

Van Til’s Presuppositional Apologetic: Transcendental Argument and the “Impossibility of the Contrary”

Cornelius Van Til (1895–1987) pioneered presuppositional apologetics, a method that starts by recognizing that believers and unbelievers have radically different foundational assumptions (presuppositions). There is no neutral ground; the Christian presupposes the triune God and His revelation as the basis for all thought, whereas the atheist presupposes human autonomy and a cosmos without God. Van Til argues that one must defend Christianity indirectly by showing that if you deny the Christian presupposition, you undermine the very possibility of rational thought, science, and morality【30†L110-L118】【4†L14911-L14918】. This form of argument is called a transcendental argument: it asks what worldview must be true in order for knowledge and experience to be meaningful. The claim is that only the Christian worldview meets these conditions, and every atheistic worldview, when pursued consistently, ends in futility or contradiction. As Greg Bahnsen (Van Til’s foremost student) summarized: “the Christian worldview is true because of the impossibility of the contrary”【30†L110-L118】. In other words, any worldview opposing Christian theism will refute itself when pressed to its logical consequences.

Methodology – Reasoning from Atheists’ Presuppositions: Van Til’s method “meets the unbeliever on their own ground” by temporarily adopting the unbeliever’s presuppositions and showing that they lead to irrationality【1†L23-L31】. We “point out to them that the contrary is impossible” because on their own terms their worldview is self-contradictory【1†L23-L31】. For example, an atheist may value logical reasoning and moral truth; presuppositional apologetics asks whether strict materialism (the typical atheist presupposition) can account for unchanging logical laws or objective moral values. Van Til contends it cannot – the atheist is like a man borrowing resources from a theistic worldview (such as trust in logic, science, or mor e denying the God who makes those resources intelligible【30†L115-L123】. Bahnsen vividly described this inconsistency: unbelievers are often “philosophically schizophrenic” – they live as if there are meaning, truth, and moral rules, but their professed worldview (e.g. a purposeless universe of matter) cannot justify those realities【30†L115-L123】. In Van Til’s words, the non-Christian is ultimately “self‐contradictory” when operating on the basis of their own assumptions【1†L23-L31】.

All Knowledge Presupposes God: A key plank in Van Til’s apologetic is the biblical teaching that God is foundational to all knowledge. Scripture declares that “the fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge” (Prov. 1:7) and that in Christ “are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” (Colossians 2:3). Far from religious belief being irrational, Van Til insists that without the God of Scripture we could not rationally know anything. Thus he famously said, “the only proof for the existence of God is that without God you couldn’t prove anything.” This bold claim is grounded in the idea that logic, scientific induction, moral norms, and even the dignity of persons all depend on the Christian metaphysic (a rational, sovereign Creator and our being made in His image). Van Til echoes the Apostle Paul: “All men know God, but all men as sinners seek to suppress their knowledge of God. They do this particularly by means of their various philosophical systems.”【33†L1-L4】 According to Romans 1:18–21, those who deny God “suppress the truth in unrighteousness,” and so become “futile in their thinking.” The 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith likewise affirms that creation and providence so clearly reveal God’s wisdom and power that they leave men “inexcusable” for unbelief【22†L81-L88】 (cf. Rom. 1:20). Unbelief is not due to insufficient evidence of God, but to a rebellious presupposition that rejects God’s authority. Therefore, Van Til approaches the atheist not as a neutral seeker who just lacks evidence, but as a hostile interpreter of evidence, bending reason and morals away from their rightful foundation in God. The task of apologetics is to expose that the atheist’s interpretation of the world is untenable and to vindicate the Christian worldview as the precondition for the intelligibility of anything whatsoever【4†L14911-L14918】.

In practical terms, a Van Tilian defense of the faith proceeds by internal critique: we step into the unbeliever’s standpoint (“pretend” for the sake of argument that there is no God) and ask: Given this assumption, can we rationally explain the universe, knowledge, ethics, and human experience? We then show that this God-denying assumption leads to insurmountable problems – indeed, to self-refutation. By contrast, if we assume the truth of the Christian worldview, these dimensions of life make sense. Van Til calls this reasoning “argument by presupposition”, or arguing transcendentally. It is an indirect proof, showing that unless the Christian God is presupposed, we lose the foundations of reasoning and morality – an “impossibilit ary”【1†L23-L31】. This method can be summarized in three key steps:

• Identify the Opponent’s Presuppositions: What does the atheist assume about reality, knowledge, and ethics (e.g. materialism, empiricism, relativism)?

• Perform an Internal Critique: Assume those presuppositions for the sake of argument, and logically trace out their implications. Does the atheist’s worldview allow for the very things they are doing (reasoning, trusting science, making moral judgments)? The goal is to show that, on their own terms, they fall into self-contradiction or cannot account for crucial aspects of human experience (logic, science, morals, meaning). As Van Til puts it, “the contrary is impossible” because the non-theistic worldview, when self-consistent, collapses into absurdity【1†L23-L31】【4†L14911-L14918】.

• Present the Christian Worldview as the Solution: Having shown the failure of atheistic presuppos apologist then presents the Christian framework – God as Creator and Lawgiver, man as His image-bearer, Scripture as revelation – as the only basis on which the intelligibility of logic, science, morality, and meaning can be affirmed. This positive case completes the transcendental argument: only by presupposing the biblical God can we avoid the skepticism and meaninglessness that otherwise result. As Van Til notes, if the conception of God is truly necessary for interpreting any fact, it is necessary for all facts and for all laws of thought【4†L14911-L14918】.

In the sections that follow, we will apply this method to several major strands of atheistic thought. By engaging Nietzsche, Marx, Russell, Dawkins, and others on their own terms, we will see a consistent pattern: each atheistic perspective, when examined presuppositionally, either undermines the possibility of rational thought and moral judgment or lives parasitically on Christian capital (unacknowledged assumptions taken from a theistic worldview). We will demonstrate, case by case, that atheism cannot escape what Van Til calls the “self-destructive” nature of unbelieving thought【1†L23-L31】. The transcendental argument will be woven throughout: showing that unless we assume the Christian God, we end up with “nothing but pitiless indifference” (to quote Dawkins) – a result that even nd impossible to consistently accept in practice.

Before proceeding, it is worth noting the tone and goal of this approach. The goal is not merely to win a debate or insult the intelligence of atheists; rather, it is to “destroy arguments” raised against the knowledge of God (2 Cor. 10:5) while humbly witnessing that without God, our reasoning falls apart. In Van Til’s approach, apologetics and evangelism merge: by showing the unbeliever his worldview’s futility, we also invite him to consider the truth of Christ. As the 1689 Baptist Confession reminds us, God in Scripture has revealed Himself sufficiently for us to have a foundation for faith and life【22†L81-L88】. Our refutation of atheism, therefore, serves to clear away excuses and demonstrate that Christian theism is not just true, but the very environment in which truth, reason, and morality thrive.

Nietzsche and Existential Atheism: The Collapse of Meaning and Morality

One of the most candid and influential atheist philosophers was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Nietzsche can be seen as a forerunner of existential atheism, grappling with the implications of a world without God. In “The Gay Science”, Nietzsche announces through the famous parable of the madman: “God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!”【18†L68-L72】. This jarring metaphor did not mean Nietzsche believed God was once alive and then literally died; rather, it signifies the collapse of belief in God in 19th-century European culture. Nietzsche understood that the “death of God” would not be a trivial matter – it would upend all values and meaning. “What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives,” he writes, and asks, “Who will wipe this blood off us?… What festivals of atonement, what holy games will we have to invent?”【18†L68-L75】. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche proclaims the advent of the Übermensch (overman) who will create new values to replace the old Judeo-Christian morality that, in Nietzsche’s view, was built on a “slave morality” and the illusion of a divine lawgiver. The heart of Nietzsche’s existential atheism is the insistence that, in a godless universe, there are no pre-given meanings or moral truths – humans must create their own values t will. All that remains is the “will to power,” as Nietzsche famously said; the concepts of good and evil are human constru r ultimately determines what will count as “right”【9†L632-L639】.

From a presuppositional standpoint, Nietzsche’s philosophy is refreshingly consistent – and thus it provides a clear test case of atheism’s viability. Nietzsche recognizes the stark truth that if God does not exist, objective morality and ultimate meaning do not exist either. Unlike other atheists who attempt to hold onto ethical or rational norms after cutting off their theistic foundation, Nietzsche takes atheism to its logical end: nihilism, the belief that life has no inherent meaning, and traditional morals are baseless. He exhorts humanity to bravely face this reality and to “transvaluate” all values – to declare as good what was formerly forbidden, and vice versa, in accordance with human desire and power.

The Presuppositional Critique: While Nietzsche’s honesty i le, the question is: Can humans truly live and think within a Nietzschean nihilistic framework? Van Til would argue that Nietzsche’s worldview, though internally coherent in its rejection of absolutes, leads to an unlivable outcome and a performative contradiction. Nietzsche himself, in acknowledging the terrifying implications of God’s “death,” notes that mankind might have to become “as gods” to justify their own existence【18†L72-L75】. Yet this is precisely the original temptation in Genesis (“you will be like God,” Genesis 3:5) – the creature claiming the Creator’s place. The transcendental problem is evident: If each individual (or perhaps an elite Übermensch) creates values by will, truth and morality become purely subjective. In such a scenario, reasoned argument loses its force – for why should one perspective (one will’s valuation) have to bow to another’s? Discourse itself presupposes some common ground of truth or logic, which Nietzsche’s radical perspectivism erodes. Indeed, if all that exists is will to power, then the very project of philosophy (which seeks what is true or good universally) becomes a kind of joke – just masked power struggles. Nietzsche realized this to an extent and famously embraced a kind of aristocratic radicalism. But notice: Nietzsche’s writings themselves make truth claims (e.g. about the genealogy of morals) that he expects his readers to find compelling or at least plausible. This is a paradox: he must assume the viability of rational communication even as he undercuts the foundations of truth and falsehood. Van Til would point out that Nietzsche’s complete subjectivism ends up invalidating the meaningfulness of Nietzsche’s own thought. If one truly adopts the premise “there is no objective truth, only interpretations,” then Nietzsche’s philosophy is itself just one interpretation with no greater claim to truth than the Christianity he despised. The stance is self-defeating, because Nietzsche wants us to accept as insight his unveiling of morality’s fictitious nature – but if all “insights” are just will to power, why pay special heed to Nietzsche’s? In presuppositional terms, his worldview cannot account for the truth value of the very critique it puts forward. It saws off the branch it sits on.

Beyond the theoretical contradiction, there is the existential contradiction. Nietzsche acknowledges that the consequences of atheism are harrowing – “How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?” he asks【18†L68-L72】. His answer is essentially an exhortation to embrace the chaos and create meaning ex nihilo. But here the apologist can ask: is it actually possible for humans to live consistently as if life has no meaning or morality? The biblical analysis (and common human experience) suggests not. Romans 2:14–15 says that the works of God’s law are “written on the heart” even of those without scripture, so that their conscience alternately accuses or excuses them. In line with this, even the staunchest nihilist finds himself moralizing or seeking meaning in practice. Nietzsche, for all his talk of going “beyond good and evil,” had a very clear sense of what he preferred (the flourishing of strong, creative individuals) versus what he despised (Christian compassion, which he saw as weakness). Thus he cou uggling in a value — the “good” of human excellence and creativity — which he believed should triumph over the life-denying ethics of Christianity. Yet on what basis can he call one set of invented values “better” than another, except his personal taste? He has no objective standard to appeal to. This illustrates what Van Til would call borrowed capital: Nietzsche criticizes Christianity for being life-denying and praises his preferred values for being life-affirming, as if “life” (thriving, power, vitality) were an intrinsically good thing. But a strictly godless, amoral universe does not confer intrinsic goodness on anything — there is no ought in a universe of mere being. The moment Nietzsche appeals to a norm like “the enhancement of life is preferable to the resentiment of the weak,” he has posited a value that he cannot justify by his premises (since by his premises, all values are arbitrary). In presuppositional terms, he is inconsistently relying on a vestige of objective value. As one commentator notes, under atheism “all that is left is a ‘will to power,’ and whoever has the power can determine what is ethical. Atheism cannot produce an ‘ought’ from a naturalistic ‘is.’”【8†L1-L4】. Nietzsche’s own doctrine ends up proving this point: if might makes right, then even the idea that one ought to live bravely and creatively (rather than, say, hedonistically or cowardly) has no binding force.

The nihilism of Nietzsche also undermines the significance of rationality and logic. Nietzsche was suspicious of abstract, universal reason, seeing it as another manifestation of the human will to impose order on ch d agree that apart from God, universal logical laws become very hard to account for – they would, at best, be human conventions or psychological habits. Nietzsche’s thought trends toward irrationalism (truth is a “mobile army of metaphors,” in his words). Yet in presenting his ideas, he implicitly relies on logical coherence enough to persuade or at least communicate. Here again we see the atheist oscillating between rationality and irrationality, a pattern Van Til often pointed out: non-Christian worldviews vacillate, unable to consistently live by their own principles. Nietzsche embraces the irrational conclusion (no truth, no morality), but then cannot help behaving at times as if some things were true or better. This betrays that the image of God in man and the inescapability of moral reality still intrude.

In summary, Nietzsche’s existential atheism, by eliminating God, eliminates truth, meaning, and morality – and in so doing, it refutes itself. It creates a worldview in which argument and reason have no foundation (why listen to a “proof” or a “reason” if all is irrational power-play?), thus undercutting Nietzsche’s own project of convincing the strong to adopt his revaluation of values. It creates a world where good and evil have no fixed reference, thus any assertion that one way of life is preferable to another rings hollow. The Christian presuppositionalist can genuinely applaud Nietzsche for seeing the stakes of the debate clearly: if there is no God, then indeed “everything is permitted” (to borrow Dostoevsky’s phrase) – no atrocity can be condemned, no virtue praised, except as an expression of someone’s preference. But this very recognition can function as a reductio ad absurdum of the atheistic premise. The 1689 Confession states that apart from God’s special revelation, the light of nature is sufficient to leave men without excuse【22†L81-L88】. Nietzsche stands “without excuse” (Rom. 1:20) in a poignant way: he knew the implications of rejecting God, yet still rejected Him. The result was a philosophy of despair mingled with defiant pride. The transcendental argument presses the question: is such a worldview even thinkable or livable? The verdict is no. The “impossibility of the contrary” here means that no society and inde dual can actually live as if there is absolutely no meaning or morality. Nietzsche’s own mental collapse at the end of his life is sometimes speculatively linked to the internal strain of his worldview (though medical factors were certainly primary). One need not make too much of that, but history has shown that ideologies adopting Nietzschean nihilism or Soci might makes right” (we think of Naziism, which was influenced by some Nietzschean ideas) lead to horrific consequences that even atheists today shudder to condemn – yet condemn they must, proving again that objective moral values are inescapable. Christianity can easily account for objective moral values (as rooted in God’s holy character) and the meaningfulness of life (as flowing from God’s purposes in creation and redemption). Atheism in Nietzsche’s form rejects these outright and offers nothing but a bold act of will. In presuppositional terms, Nietzsche has “transcended” good and evil only by destroying the basis for calling anything good or evil – an outcome which, by being unlivable, demonstrates that his premise (the non-existence of the true God) leads to absurdity. The transcendental argument thus finds confirmation: only if God exists (and the Christian worldview is true) can we make sense of moral duty and existential meaning; if God is dead, then truth and goodness die with Him – an impossibility that human beings cannot consistently embrace. In the end, Nietzsche serves mirror confirming the apostle Paul’s statement that those who refuse to honor God “became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened” (Rom. 1:21). The biblical term for one who says “There is no God” is “fool” (Psalm 14:1) – not indicating low IQ, but a culpable rejection of wisdom. Tragically, Nietzsche’s brilliant but “foolish” system exemplifies this verse. A presuppositional refutation of Nietzsche is ultimately a reduction to absurdity: it shows that Nietzsche’s atheistic starting point would render the world unintelligible and morality void – conclusions that even Nietzsche cannot help but shrink from at points (e.g. his longing for “festivals of atonement” and cleansings【18†L70-L77】 shows a wistful acknowledgement of guilt and the need for expiation, concepts that make sense only if an objective moral order has been violated). Christianity, by contrast, offers true atonement in Christ and a coherent framework where moral facts and human longings for meaning are not illusory, but reflections of the way things truly are under God. In the final assessment, Nietzsche’s “will to power” philosophy demonstrates that without the Christian God, one is left trying to be one’s own god – an impossible and self-defeating venture, as the serpent’s promise in Eden turned out to be a lie.

Marx and Marxist Atheism: Dialectical Materialism and the Illusion of Morality

If Nietzsche represents the individual, existential response to atheism, Karl Marx (1818–1883) represents a comprehensive social, economic, and political program built on atheistic presuppositions. Marxist atheism is a key example of materialism in practice: it asserts that matter (and economic relations in particular) is all that exists, and that human society and thought are ultimately determined by material conditions. Marx famously declared that religion is “the opium of the people”【11†L42-L45】 – a fantasy that offers illusory happiness and comfort to the oppressed, but also keeps them passive. In context, Marx argued that religion is a product of alienation and will fade away once material conditions (especially class oppression) are overcome【11†L37-L45】【11†L47-L55】. For Marx, man is a purely socio-economic being: “Man makes religion, religion does not make man”【11†L27-L34】. All beliefs and ideologies (including morality and religion) are part of the superstructure determined by the economic base. Marx’s worldview, often called dialectical materialism, posits that history unfolds through a dialectic of class struggles, moving inexorably (he thought) toward a communist utopia where there is no private property, no classes, and therefore no need for religion or government. In that future, human beings will “revolve around themselves as their own true Sun” rather than around an illusory God【11†L53-L60】. This striking image from Marx’s 1844 critique encapsulates his atheism: humanity will effectively divinize itself, becoming the center of meaning and value, once the “halo” of religion is cast off【11†L47-L55】【11†L53-L60】.

The Presuppositions of Marxist Atheism: At its core, Marxism presupposes a materialistic monism – only the material world is real, and there is no transcendent God or soul. Everything about human culture (law, morality, religion, art) is ultimately explicable by material forces (economics, modes of production). It also presupposes a kind of historical determinism – history has an inevitable trajectory (though brought about by human action, it is “scientifically” predictable in Marx’s view). Marx inherited from Hegel a notion of dialectical progress but stripped it of Hegel’s spiritual or idealist element, making it purely economic and material. Crucially, Marxism is atheism with a mission: unlike Nietzsche’s rather aristocratic disdain for the masses, Marx has a moral fervor – to liberate humanity from oppression. He decries the “heartless world” of capitalism and wants to create a just world without exploitation【11†L39-L47】. Marxism thus has an embedded ethic: equality, abolition of exploitation, communal well-being. Yet Marx grounds this ethic not in any divine law (which he rejects), but in the movement of history and the “true interests” of the proletariat class. The Marxist narrative is often described as a secular eschatology: it has a paradise (classless society) and a fall (private property), prophets (Marx, Engels) and a chosen class (the proletariat), and it identifi false consciousness to be overcome.

Presuppositional Analysis: Van Til, writing in the mid-20th century, certainly took notice of Marxist and socialist worldviews as prominent forms of unbelief. The transcendental critique of Marxist atheism can proceed on multiple fronts. At root, Marxism suffers from the same fundamental flaw as all forms of atheistic materialism: it cannot justify the existence of immaterial realities that we all depend on (logic, moral law, human rights, etc.), nor can it justify its own intense moral zeal on purely material grounds. We can examine a few aspects in detail:

• Morality and Justice: Marxists clearly have a strong moral impulse – they speak of exploitation as evil, of justice for the oppressed as good. Marx himself called for the “real happiness” of the people in place of illusory religious comfort【11†L47-L55】. The paradox is that, within a strictly materialistic framework, morality itself must be an illusion or a tool. If all thought is determined by class interests and economics, then moral principles are not objective truths; they are instruments by which one class furthers its interest. Marx more or less says this about religion and traditional morality (seeing them as bourgeois tools of control), but he imagines that his own stance – a classless ethic of fairness – is not likewise a mere ideological reflex but the truth of history. This is a self-contradiction. If no values are absolute (because there is no God, only huma then the value “exploitation is wrong” is al ute – it is just a sentiment that happened to arise in Marx under certain conditions. Perhaps it serves the interest of the proletariat, but why should the universe (or anyone outside the proletariat) care? Suppose  is indeed a construct, and I choose the value that the strong taking from the weak is natural and fine.” On what basis can the Marxist object? Marx can appeal to class solidarity or future  f someone simply doesn’t value those, there is no practice, Marxist regimes often enforced their vision by force (since, indeed, power was the ultimate arbitrator once God was removed). The presuppositional point is: as no transcendent grounding for the moral outrage that energizes its program**. It must tacitly assume that things like oppression wrong and equality is truly good – objective moral valuations that make sense only if humans are more than material and there is a moral law higher than society. The Christian can agree that oppression i humans bear God’s image and are to love neighbor as self), but Marxism undercuts the very concepts of human dignity and moral responsibility by making us cogs in an economic machine. As one analysis put it, under consistent atheism “there is no norma ere is just opinion”【9†L632-L639】. Marxism attempts to rise above mere opinion with a “scientific socialism” that declares exploitation objectively bad – but science cannot produce ought from is. t atheism steals moral concepts from the Christian worldview (like justice, liberation, human equality) while denying the foundation (the image of God in man and the authority o law). It is telling that Marx said man will walk upright and “revolve around himself” once freed from religion【11†L53-L60】 – this is essentially enthroning human reason or society as god. Yet a finite, material god cannot secure moral absolutes.  at Marxist morality often reduces to utilitarianism (whatever furthers the revolution is good, whatever hinders it is evil), which justified terrible means (gulags, purges) for the purported end of equality. In hindsight, even secular people now often morally condemn the atrocities of Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, etc. – but by what standard? The consistent Marxist could only say those leaders perhaps misjudged what would further the revolution, not that they sinned against any higher law, since none exists in Marxism. Van Til’s argument here would stress the borrowed moral capital: communism indignantly decries the suffering of the poor (a compassion that has Christian resonance, as the Bible also speaks much of justice for the poor)【9†L628-L636】, but then in power communism has trampled individuals in service of an abstraction (the class or the state). This reveals that without a true transcendent Person (God) to whom every human soul is accountable and who guarantees each person’s worth, even well-meaning atheistic moral zeal can turn brutally inhuman. The impossibility of the contrary is seen in that Marxists cannot actually treat morality as a pure illusion of class – they cannot live that out consistently, because they do care about right and wrong. But by rejecting the existence of God, they have no firm reason why right is right. The result has been either moral chaos or the covert smuggling in of Christian ethical ideals under new terminology.

• Truth and Ideology: Marxism holds that one’s beliefs are conditioned by one’s class position – “ideology” is a reflection of material interests. Religion, for example, is a comfort for the oppressed or a tool of the oppressor, but in either case not true in a correspondence-to-reality sense. Marx claimed his own theory was scientific truth, not mere ideology, because he aligned with the proletariat, which he saw as the vehicle of inevitable historical progress. However, a presuppositional critique can ask: If all thought is materially conditioned, what makes Marx’s thought exempt? If a theist’s belief in God is just a product of his social conditioning (a bourgeois wish-dream or a pre-modern ignorance), why wouldn’t Marx’s belief in dialectical materialism be just a product of his bourgeois upbringing or his bias as an atheist? In fact, Marx’s worldview was highly influenced by 19th-century science and philosophy – one could easily say he just reflected the bias of his era toward progress and secularism. The problem is that Marxism undermines the notion of objective truth. By reducing ideas to epiphenomena of class and economics, it suggests no viewpoint is disinterested. But then the validity of Marxism itself becomes suspect by its own standard. Van Til would label this a self-refuting epistemology. Just as a thoroughgoing skeptic who says “there is no truth” refutes himself (since that statement purports to be true), the Marxist who says “all beliefs are class-conditioned illusions” must either exempt his own belief (arbitrarily) or include it, which would make it just an illusion of a disaffected intellectual. Either way, Marxism cannot account for the existence of truth that transcends social conditions – yet it has to assume such truth in order to argue and persuade. The Christian worldview, by contrast, can account for truth because human minds, while fallible, are made in the image of a rational God, and God’s revelation provides an absolute reference point. Marxism denies such a reference point, so truth becomes a function of power dynamics. This again collapses rational inquiry: if what I call “true” is simply what my economic interest makes me say, then argument is futile – we should just identify and perhaps eliminate the opposing class, not reason with them. Sadly, in some communist regimes, this is exactly what happened (people were not refuted, they were “re-educated” or liquidated as class enemies). This demonstrates Van Til’s point that rejecting the Christian God tends toward irrational force over rational persuasion, because the worldview lacking God lacks any suasion beyond material power.

• Human Nature and Purpose: Marxism assumes a rather optimistic view of human malleability. Since it denies a fixed human nature (no soul, no creation order), it implies that if you change the economic system, you can virtually create a “new man” – cooperative, altruistic, unalienated. History has not borne this out; human selfishness persisted under communism, often in more virulent forms (e.g. corruption, power hoarding by party elites). From a presuppositional perspective, Marxism erred by ignoring the biblical teaching of sin as an inherent problem of the human heart (Jer. 17:9, Mark 7:21–23). By locating all evil in external structures, Marxism made a category error. It sought societal salvation without dealing with the root cause of evil (the creature’s rebellion against the Creator). The 1689 Confession in its anthropology (ch. 6) affirms the sinfulness of man since the Fall, which necessitates divine grace, not merely economic rearrangement, for true restoration. Marx’s atheism left no room for this spiritual diagnosis, thus prescribing inadequate cures. This again highlights the impossibility of constructing a utopia while denying the reality of God and sin – the project ironically ends up confirming the Christian doctrine of sin (as even the revolutionaries succumbed to pride, cruelty, and lust for power). The Christian worldview predicts that apart from regeneration, no system will eliminate evil, whereas the Marxist worldview was blind to this and thus repeatedly shocked by the failure of “the new socialist man” to materialize. Here the transcendental contrast is stark: the Christian worldview can coherently explain why utopian schemes fail (they ignore the spiritual dimension and man’s need for God), whereas the atheistic worldview of Marxism had to keep blaming scapegoats (saboteurs, remaining bourgeois influences) when its predictions did not pan out. In essence, Marxist atheism could not even account for the persistence of moral failings in its own adherents, except by ad hoc adjustments, because its presuppositions disallowed the obvious truth that man is more than an economic animal and has a moral conscience (which the Bible says is given by God).

• Providence and the Uniformity of History: Marxism offered a pseudo-sovereignty in the form of Historical Necessity. But who or what guarantees that history will follow the predicted path? Without God, Marx had to personify History itself as a quasi-deterministic force (dialectical laws inherited from Hegel but with “nature” as their substrate). This is almost a mythological substitute for divine providence. Van Til would say that Marxism here is unconsciously mimicking the Christian belief in a sovereign plan, yet trying to relocate sovereignty in impersonal matter. The result is deeply problematic: how can matter (which operates by blind forces) guarantee a rational direction or purpose in history? In a chance universe, there is no ultimate telos. Marx borrowed the idea of a telos (end-goal) for history from the Judeo-Christian worldview (which views history as moving toward the Kingdom of God), but without the Author of history, this confidence is misplaced. Indeed, by the late 20th century, history did not deliver the global communist paradise – instead, many Marxist states collapsed or reformed toward capitalism. The “inevitable laws” proved not inevitable. This underscores that the materialist presupposition provides no basis to expect orderly progress. Only a personal God who orders events could ensure a plan; absent God, any apparent direction in history is either imposed by our minds or just a temporary pattern. Thus Marx’s grand narrative was a secular faith, not a truly scientific certainty. By presupposing a law-governed, purposeful history, Marxism actually leaned on theistic assumptions (laws of history, meaning in history) while officially denying them. This inconsistency illustrates Van Til’s point that unbelief cannot be utterly consistent – it will sneak in the very things it says don’t exist (here, a substitute providence).

In summary, Marxist atheism is a prime example of a worldview that on the surface is systematic and confident, but at its core is internally incoherent when scrutinized presuppositionally. It denounces moral evils while denying any transcendent moral lawgiver; it claims objective truth for its theory while reducing all other thought to subjective ideology; it promises human emancipation while treating humans as determined by material processes (thus undercutting freedom and responsibility); and it posits an orderly historical purpose while denying the only Person (God) capable of ordaining such purpose. Each of these contradictions can be pressed in dialogue with a Marxist. For instance, one might ask: “You say religion is an illusion and morality is relative to class, yet you obviously believe your critique is true and that justice (as you define it) should be pursued. But if there is no God, on what basis is your vision of justice obligatory or your view true rather than simply useful for your class? Are not your own beliefs subject to the same reductive analysis you apply to others’ beliefs?” This line of questioning forces the atheist to either relativize everything (and thus abandon any pretense of moral or factual high ground) or to implicitly appeal to a standard beyond class and matter – which is precisely to appeal to God (albeit unknowingly). Christian apologist Francis Schaeffer used to say that when an unbeliever leans too far out of the real world (God’s world) in his theory, he will feel the tension – “his feet are in mid-air.” The role of the apologist is to push the man in the direction his position leads, so that he feels the psychological pressure of its failure. In Marx’s case, push him to admit either that all morality (including his) is a sham (an admission few could live with), or that some morality (like caring for the oppressed) is truly valid – which then begs for a source of moral truth beyond societal evolution.

Historically, it is noteworthy that many who initially embraced Marxist atheism became disillusioned by its failure to account for human reality. Thinkers of the Frankfurt School, for example, began to incorporate insights from psychology and even religion, tacitly acknowledging that the Marxist purely materialistic account was incomplete. Some contemporary atheists also critique Marxist regimes on humanistic grounds – but again, on what basis can they condemn gulags as truly wrong if morality is just a human construct? Only by tacitly assuming some objective human rights or dignity – concepts that make sense in a theistic worldview (because humans are created and loved by God), but are inconsistent with strict materialism.

From the perspective of the 1689 Confession, Marxist atheism denies core truths: God’s creation of the world (LBCF ch.4), God’s providential governance of all things (ch.5), the fallenness of man (ch.6), and the first commandment (to have no other gods – Marxism effectively made an idol of the Revolution or the State). The Confession’s assertion that even the light of nature reveals enough of God to leave men inexcusable applies to Marx and his followers【22†L81-L88】. They saw the injustice of the world (which actually corroborates the Christian doctrine of human sin and the need for divine justice), but rather than submit to God, they built a godless creed to fix it, resulting in new injustices. In biblical terms, Marxist atheism repeats the error of those in Romans 1:25 who “exchanged the truth of God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator.” Marx wanted man to be his own sun, society to be the highest authority – a form of idolatry of human collective. The presuppositional refutation, then, is to show that this idolatry cannot bear the weight of reality. It neither explains the human condition adequately nor provides the moral and rational foundations it claims to offer. Only by returning to the acknowledgment of the true Creator can the thirst for justice and truth that motivated Marx be ultimately fulfilled. Ironically, the Christian can affirm Marx’s passion for justice while redirecting it: yes, we should seek to alleviate oppression, but the ultimate oppressor is sin and death, and the ultimate Liberator is Christ (not the proletariat). A society without God ends up oppressing in new ways because it lacks the transcendent check on human depravity. Thus, the very evils Marx fought against re-emerge within Marxism’s triumph, demonstrating that “except the Lord build the house, they labor in vain that build it” (Psalm 127:1).

In conclusion, Marxist atheism is refuted presuppositionally by its inability to uphold the very values it cherishes. The impossibility of the contrary is evident: try to have a world of universal justice and equality without God, and you end up with inconsistency, tyranny, or despair. Only with God – the impartial Judge and loving Creator – can notions of justice and the brotherhood of man have a firm grounding. Christianity does not make a utopia on earth by human effort, but it provides the basis for genuine justice, mercy, and hope which Marxism distorted but could not dispense with. The transcendental argument, applied here, shows that if the God of Scripture is not presupposed, the Marxist’s ardent pleas for justice reduce to a power play or a natural instinct; but since we all know in our heart that justice is more than that, we implicitly know that God must exist to validate it. Marxism’s failure in theory and practice thus indirectly points to the truth of the biblical worldview it denied.

Bertrand Russell and Secular Rationalism: Meaning, Morality, and the Limits of Naturalism

Moving from the 19th-century thinkers to the 20th, Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) stands as a towering figure of secular rationalism and humanistic atheism. A mathematician, logician, and philosopher, Russell authored the famous essay “Why I Am Not a Christian” (1927) and was a vocal critic of religion. Unlike Nietzsche’s poetic existential revolt or Marx’s revolutionary program, Russell’s atheism was of a more analytic and ethical bent: he believed that traditional arguments for God failed, and that one could lead a good life guided by reason, science, and a mild benevolence without religious belief. Russell exemplifies the strand of atheism that trusts in human reason and scientific progress to guide us, and that often retains a strong sense of ethical duty and even purpose on a temporal scale (improving human society), while denying any ultimate purpose given by a Creator. Notably, Russell acknowledged the existential predicament posed by atheism. In his early essay “A Free Man’s Worship” (1903), Russell wrote that man’s life is purposeless and insignificant in a universe destined for ruin, and that we must build our lives on “the firm foundation of unyielding despair.” Despite such bleak reflections, Russell himself did not descend into nihilism; he campaigned for peace, advocated for education and rational inquiry, and even in his 80s was writing letters to world leaders about nuclear disarmament. In a candid moment, Russell reportedly quipped: “Unless you assume a God, the question of life’s purpose is meaningless.”【15†L159-L163】 In a letter from 1952, Russell indeed wrote, “Unless you assume a God, the question [of life’s purpose] is meaningless”【15†L159-L163】. He did not mean that therefore one should assume God; rather, he accepted that ultimately life has no cosmic purpose, but believed we can create provisional purposes (such as love, knowledge, etc.) for ourselves.

The Rationalist-Humanist Atheist: Russell’s atheism is representative of many intellectually fulfilled skeptics of the 20th century. He prized logic (co-authoring Principia Mathematica to ground mathematics in logic) and empirical science. He was not an eliminative materialist in the crude sense; he allowed for abstract entities like numbers and was aware of philosophical subtleties. However, he staunchly denied any supernatural reality. Ethically, Russell was a proponent of a kind of utilitarian or consequentialist morality rooted in human empathy and social contract. He believed humans could be ethical without God – in fact, he often argued that fear of punishment (hell) is a poor motivator compared to reasoned understanding of consequences. Russell’s worldview might be called Secular Humanism: it upholds human reason, science, and ethics (without absolutes) aimed at human flourishing, all within an atheistic, naturalistic framework.

Presuppositional Critique: In engaging with a Russell-type atheist, the presuppositionalist notes a pronounced internal tension: on one hand, a denial of any transcendent foundation (no God, no ultimate meaning, no absolute moral values); on the other, a life devoted to truth, reason, and humanitarian ethics as if these things really matter. Russell once wrote that we must recognize the universe has “no design, no purpose,” yet he spent his life in purposeful activity and assumed the meaningfulness of truth and goodness. This kind of atheism is arguably more common than Nietzsche’s or Marx’s, and thus it is a prime target for Van Til’s apologetic: it is the stance of the person who says “I don’t believe in God, but I do believe in reason and morality.” The task is to show that reason and morality themselves cannot be ultimately justified apart from God.

Consider meaning and purpose, first. Russell admitted that without God, the very question of life’s purpose is moot【15†L159-L163】. He accepted that any purpose we have is one we invent. Here the presuppositional approach might ask: Is it possible to live consistently while believing “my purpose is only self-assigned and ultimately arbitrary”? Humans have an innate drive to see their lives as significant in some objective sense. If the universe truly cares nothing (as Russell’s atheism holds), then all our endeavors – writing great works, helping the poor, advancing knowledge – ultimately amount to nothing in the grand scheme (eventually heat death of the universe erases all). Russell knew this, yet he soldiered on, choosing to devote himself to causes. The inconsistency is not that he chose to do so (one can choose despite lack of cosmic meaning), but that in so doing he often spoke and acted as if certain things really mattered beyond personal preference. For example, he urged for nuclear disarmament as if it was a pressing moral imperative for all humanity – a stance hard to justify if one truly internalizes that humanity is an accidental speck destined for extinction. If there is no ultimate value, why is survival or peace better than death and war? Russell might answer in pragmatic terms (we prefer survival and peace). Yet this reduces profound moral imperatives to mere preferences of a biological organism – a reduction most humanists find unsatisfying. The presuppositionalist presses that discomfort: Deep down, do we not sense that love is truly better than hate, peace better than war, knowledge better than ignorance – and not just because we happen to feel that way, but because these are real values? If so, whence this reality? In the Christian worldview, these values reflect the character and will of God (who is love, who commands peace and truth). In Russell’s atheism, they ultimately have no grounding beyond perhaps evolutionary advantage or social conditioning. Russell once said: “I do not think man’s existence has any purpose. … one who does not believe in God can only recognize the individual purposes of separate men and animals.”【15†L188-L195】. This is a clear admission of the limitation: only individual, subjective purposes exist. Yet in practice, Russell appealed to shared, almost objective purposes (like preventing nuclear annihilation for the good of mankind). He even founded a fellowship (the Bertrand Russell Society) to carry on rational humanitarian ideals. This suggests that living as if no objective purpose exists is extremely difficult; people end up treating some purposes as if they were objectively meaningful.

Now consider moral values and duties. Russell was an ethical thinker; he debated morality often. He dismissed the idea that morality requires God, arguing that humans can determine right and wrong by considering the consequences of actions for human well-being. In doing so, however, Russell implicitly assumed that human well-being is an appropriate standard – an assumption that is not derivable from atheistic premises alone. Why ought we value human well-being? Nature apart from God doesn’t tell us that – nature is “red in tooth and claw,” indifferent to suffering. If we say “because we desire it,” then morality reduces to a form of enlightened self-interest or herd instinct. But true morality often calls us to do what is right even if it is not in our self-interest. Russell, for example, risked imprisonment in protesting wars – a self-sacrificial stance. On what basis can his atheist worldview label such sacrifice “good” or “obligatory”? Van Til would argue that objective moral duty cannot exist if there is no moral lawgiver above humans. Russell actually agreed that without God, morals are not absolute – he was a kind of moral relativist or subjectivist. Yet he spoke about moral issues (women’s rights, anti-imperialism, etc.) with a passion that suggested more than mere personal taste. The language of good and evil pervades even secular discourse, but if pressed, an atheist like Russell must reduce “good” to either what majority decides, or what promotes survival, etc., none of which yields a binding moral “ought.” As one evolutionary ethicist frankly admitted: “ethics as we understand it is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes… it is without external grounding”【9†L627-L635】. If Russell embraced a similar view (that morality is an illusion born of social instincts), then his attempts to persuade others by moral argument becomes strange – why argue if moral feelings are just instincts? One might as well try to convince a tiger not to eat antelope. The very practice of moral reasoning presupposes that there are rational grounds to prefer one action over another beyond mere instinct. That fits poorly in a naturalistic framework. Christian theism, on the other hand, provides that ground: God’s revealed will and the conscience He planted in us (Romans 2:15) give a real, prescriptive force to morality. The presuppositional apologist will highlight that Russell’s confidence in moral reasoning borrowed from a Christian outlook in which moral truths are real and discoverable. Indeed, Russell’s ethical ideals (peace, equality, philanthropy) closely mirror Judeo-Christian ethical themes – yet he had to try to sustain them in mid-air, as it were, after severing the root. This is why Van Til often said that unbelievers steal capital from Christianity. Russell stole the fruits of Christian morality (like concern for justice and compassion) and replanted them in the soil of a godless universe, where such fruits have no nourishment. It is a testament to the image of God in man that Russell continued to feel moral emotions and make moral judgments – he could not escape being a moral creature. But his philosophy could not justify why those moral intuitions should be obeyed. Hence, the inconsistency.

Logic and Reason: Being a logician, Russell put tremendous trust in the power of human reason. Here too we raise a transcendental issue: What grounds the laws of logic and the reliability of human reason in an atheistic universe? Russell worked on reducing mathematics to logic, showcasing the deep intellectual order in reality. But if reality at base is just matter-energy flux, why should it exhibit logical order comprehensible to the human mind? Russell might respond that if it didn’t, we wouldn’t be here to ask (an anthropic sort of answer), or that it just does as a brute fact. Yet this is unsatisfactory philosophically. The Christian worldview posits a rational God who created both the external world and our minds; thus the success of reason and mathematics in describing the universe is not surprising (indeed, expected: we are thinking God’s thoughts after Him). Atheistic naturalism lacks this explanatory coherence. Russell encountered a version of this problem in his own field: the problem of induction. Hume had shown that we cannot rationally justify inductive inference (assuming the future will be like the past) without circularity. Russell was well aware of this problem – he wrote about the “inductivist turkey” that expects food every day until suddenly Christmas comes and it is slaughtered, illustrating the failure of naive induction. If the universe has no guiding providence, induction (the basis of all science) is an uncertain gamble. Russell confessed he had no solution to Hume’s problem – one proceeds with induction out of habit or necessity, not rational certainty. This again is an example of a precondition of knowledge (uniformity of nature) that atheism takes for granted but cannot justify. By contrast, the Christian presupposes that a faithful God upholds the cosmos in an orderly way (Genesis 8:22, Jeremiah 33:25 speak to the regularity of nature under God’s ordinance). Thus, doing science in a Christian framework has a metaphysical grounding. Russell wanted the fruits of science without acknowledging the root; he might have said the root was unneeded, but in fact his inability to solve induction hints that the root was indeed missing in his system. Greg Bahnsen often argued this point: the uniformity of nature and the laws of logic are presupposed by all reasoning, yet only theism furnishes a worldview in which such presuppositions make sense【30†L123-L129】. An atheist like Russell uses logic and expects natural order, but when pressed, he must say these things “just are” – an arbitrary posit. Arbitrary foundations, however, are the hallmark of an irrational approach (it is essentially a leap of faith, albeit not recognized as such). Thus the rationalist atheist actually has an irrational streak: he cannot account for the reliability of reason itself. Van Til notes that if man’s mind is the ultimate reference (as Russell would hold, rejecting any divine mind), then we are left in a sea of subjectivity or convention. Logical laws would either be man-made (thus not universally binding) or simply unexplained coincidences. In either case, why trust them unwaveringly? Here again, the unbeliever exhibits what Bahnsen called “philosophical schizophrenia”【30†L115-L123】 – behaving as if the world is rational and his mind can discover truth (which fits a Christian paradigm), while espousing a philosophy that says the mind is just a byproduct of mindless nature (which would undercut confidence in reasoning as aimed at truth rather than survival). Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga articulated this as the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism: if both naturalism and evolution are true,… (content continues)

Russell himself grappled with this tension. In logic and mathematics, he sought absolute certainty, yet Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (1931) dashed the hope of a complete, self-contained rational system. In epistemology, Russell admitted that the uniformity of nature (the basis of induction) is not logically provable – we rely on it by habit or probability, not because we can justify it. These admissions highlight that atheistic naturalism provides no foundation for the rational order we empirically find. Russell, like all atheists, had to assume that the universe is orderly and the mind reliable – but why assume that, if the universe is ultimately a product of blind chaos? The Christian answer is that an orderly God created an orderly universe and our minds in His image; the atheist has no equivalent answer. As Bahnsen notes, those who deny God “have no way to account for the uniformity of nature and its laws”, so the knowledge they do have is “borrowed knowledge, stolen from the Christian-theistic pasture”【30†L123-L129】. Van Til quips that the unbeliever can count, but cannot account for counting. We see this in Russell: he uses reason and enjoys its fruits, but cannot finally account for a universe where reason works. According to the biblical worldview, Russell’s very ability to do mathematics or physics is a gift from God and reflects God’s rationality – but Russell, refusing to acknowledge the Giver, is left without a coherent explanation for the gift.

Summing up Russell’s Predicament: Bertrand Russell’s secular humanist atheism is internally inconsistent. It affirms no Creator, no ultimate purpose, no absolute moral law – yet Russell lived as if truth mattered, as if life had purpose (however self-chosen), and as if certain moral causes were worth fighting for universally. He even acknowledged that without God, questions of ultimate meaning are meaningless【15†L159-L163】, but proceeded to act as though life did have meaning found in love and reason. This inconsistency is precisely what Van Til’s apologetic highlights: the unbeliever cannot help but live in God’s world and use God’s gifts (intellect, conscience, moral intuition), even while denying God. The result is an unstable blend of borrowed Christian values and arbitrary human stipulations. Russell’s worldview could not provide what his heart and mind needed – a basis for hope, meaning, and rational confidence. Thus, presuppositionally, Russell’s atheism refutes itself: it says there is no objective meaning, yet the way Russell behaves and argues only makes sense if objective meaning (and truth and goodness) do exist. The transcendental argument would press Russell (and those like him) to see that by rejecting God, they have made the quest for truth and goodness unintelligible. As Psalm 36:9 says of God, “in Thy light shall we see light” – only in the light of God’s existence do our endeavors of science and ethics “see light” (make sense). Russell refused that light, and so, brilliant as he was, he had to work in partial darkness, periodically conceding the futility that lurked at the edges of his philosophy. Christians can affirm many of Russell’s moral and rational aims (peace, clarity of thought, compassion), but must point out that Russell’s secular foundation was insufficient for those aims. The 1689 Confession affirms that even the wisest unbelievers ultimately “became vain in their imaginations” when they knew not God (paraphrasing Romans 1:21) – a verdict aptly illustrated by Russell’s poignant image of building on “unyielding despair.” The Christian apologist can thus respectfully challenge the secular rationalist: Your humanitarian values and trust in reason are better explained by the Christian worldview you dismiss. Only if God is real can we have confidence that moral ideals are not illusory and that our reason reflects the structure of the world. In the end, Russell’s life and letters testify to the truth of his own remark: “Unless you assume a God, the question of life’s purpose is meaningless.”【15†L159-L163】 By God’s common grace, Russell lived above the complete meaninglessness that atheism implies – but in doing so, he lived on borrowed time and borrowed values. A presuppositional refutation shows that his worldview, taken on its own merits, collapses into the very meaninglessness and relativism he dreaded, and only a return to the Christian presupposition can rescue the things he cherished (meaning, truth, goodness) from that collapse.

Richard Dawkins and New Atheism: Scientism, Morality and Borrowed Capital

In the early 21st century, New Atheism emerged as a vocal movement led by figures like Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett. New Atheism is essentially a reinvigorated materialism coupled with a zealous anti-religious stance. It differs from earlier atheism chiefly in its tone (bold and populist) and its emphasis on science as the only credible source of knowledge (often sliding into scientism, the belief that empirical science answers all important questions). Richard Dawkins, an evolutionary biologist and author of The God Delusion (2006), exemplifies New Atheism’s approach: he argues that belief in God is a delusion, that evolution and cosmology render God unnecessary, and that religion is not only false but harmful. Dawkins and his fellow “New Atheists” often couch their arguments in strident moral terms – e.g. calling religion evil or labeling the God of the Bible as immoral – while simultaneously maintaining a worldview of strict naturalism in which, theoretically, morality is just a byproduct of evolution or social conditioning. This juxtaposition makes New Atheism a ripe target for presuppositional analysis, because the inconsistency is especially glaring: on one hand, Dawkins insists we live in a universe that is “just electrons and selfish genes” without design or objective moral values; on the other hand, he speaks as a moral crusader against what he perceives as the evils of religion and ignorance. As we will see, New Atheism illustrates perhaps more bluntly than any other school the phenomenon of borrowing theistic capital while denying theism.

Rationality and Scientism: New Atheists place great confidence in human reason and science. Dawkins venerates the power of Darwinian natural selection to explain life’s complexity and believes that eventually science will explain consciousness, morality, and every mystery without invoking God. The presuppositional question remains: What accounts for the success of reason and science in a godless universe? The New Atheist answer tends to be evolution: our cognitive faculties evolved to track reality accurately (at least at a practical level) because that had survival value. But this answer is fraught with difficulties. Evolution favors traits that aid survival and reproduction, not necessarily true beliefs. False beliefs can sometimes be advantageous, so long as behaviorally they lead to survival. As Alvin Plantinga and others have argued, a naturalistic evolution scenario gives one no strong assurance that our cognitive faculties are truth-oriented【30†L123-L129】. The very reliability of human reason that Dawkins presupposes becomes questionable under his worldview. Moreover, the New Atheist’s commitment to scientific induction (deriving general laws from particular observations and trusting that those laws will hold tomorrow) is, as discussed, an act of faith in uniformity. When pressed, Dawkins might say uniformity is just a fundamental feature of reality – in other words, a brute given. But appealing to a brute unexplained principle is hardly a “scientific” explanation; it is tantamount to saying “that’s just the way it is.” Here the transcendental argument exposes that even the ability to do science is inexplicable on Dawkins’ terms. Only if there is a rational Lawgiver who imposed order on nature can we understand why nature operates by stable laws. The London Confession (1689) explicitly attributes the regular governance of all things to God’s providence【28†L68-L75】 – a truth that undergirded the rise of modern science (many early scientists were devout theists who assumed a law-giving God behind natural laws). Dawkins rejects this foundation yet continues to depend on the reliability of science, essentially helping himself to the fruit of a tree he has cut down. In Van Til’s analogy, Dawkins is like the child who must sit on his father’s lap to slap his father – using the intelligence and order God bestowed to try to disprove God. Without God’s lap to support him, the child would have no height or leverage to land the blow.

Moral Indignation in a Amoral Universe: New Atheists are known for their moral critiques of religion. Christopher Hitchens’ book God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007) is indicative – it makes an impassioned case that religion causes great evil (violence, oppression, ignorance) in the world. Sam Harris in The End of Faith (2004) similarly argues that religious faith is dangerous and we should transition to purely secular, rational ethics. Dawkins often speaks of the “evil” done in religion’s name and has called biblical morality deplorable. The irony, from a presuppositional perspective, is that Dawkins elsewhere acknowledges that if his atheistic worldview is true, “there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.”【20†L87-L92】 (This quote from River Out of Eden succinctly captures the nihilistic implication of Dawkins’ naturalism.) We must pause and let that sink in: Dawkins the scientist says the universe has “no evil, no good” in reality – yet Dawkins the polemicist rails against religion as though evil and good really exist. This is a flagrant self-contradiction. If Dawkins were fully consistent with “no good, no evil, just blind pitiless indifference,” he would have to admit that all moral judgments (including his own) are subjective preferences or evolutionary impulses, nothing more. But in practice he does not treat them that way – he genuinely thinks, for example, that abusing a child’s mind with religious fear is wrong, that educating children in science is good, that stoning adulterers (as in some theocratic codes) is evil, and so on. Presuppositionalism highlights this inconsistency: the New Atheist cannot live within the moral vacuum of his own worldview. He inevitably smuggles in moral absolutes. Perhaps he will say, “We determine good as whatever promotes human well-being.” But who is “we” and why is human well-being the standard? Often the answer is a circular one: “because we choose to value well-being.” This reduces morality to a collective decision or an instinct – which means it carries no objective obligation. If a human or a society chooses a different value (say, power or military glory or even survival of one’s tribe at the expense of others), there is no higher tribunal to say they are wrong, on Dawkins’ terms. And yet Dawkins and friends speak as if there is a higher tribunal – Reason or Science or Human Rights – which all ought to acknowledge. This is borrowing from the Christian worldview, wherein there is indeed a universal moral Lawgiver and an objective human dignity. The New Atheists inherit centuries of Christian moral consensus (e.g. valuing compassion, honesty, enemy-love, human equality) and assume those values as givens, even while denying the source that endowed them. Not all atheists do this unwittingly – philosopher Michael Ruse, for example, candidly admits that from a Darwinian perspective, “morality… is merely an adaptation put in place to further our reproductive ends. … ethics as we understand it is an illusion fobbed off on us by our genes”【9†L627-L635】. Ruse goes on to say that such morality has “no external grounding” – it is ultimately arbitrary in a naturalistic universe【9†L628-L636】. Dawkins, however, writes and speaks as though morality does have external grounding – he appeals to what any “reasonable” or “decent” person should recognize. This duplicity is not personal hypocrisy per se; it is the inevitable schizophrenia of an atheist who is still a moral being. Romans 2:15 describes people who have not the law of God externally yet “show the work of the law written on their hearts.” The New Atheist’s heart knows that torture is wrong, love is good, etc., but his philosophy tells him these are just evolved feelings. When push comes to shove, he behaves according to the ingrained moral law (outrage at injustice) rather than according to his amoral philosophy – and thank God he does, but that very fact testifies to the truth of the Christian position. Atheism cannot produce an “ought” from an “is,” as we noted earlier【8†L1-L4】, yet New Atheists constantly talk in oughts (e.g. “we ought to rid the world of the scourge of religion”). Their condemnations of “God’s crimes” or religious fanatics ring hollow once the listener realizes that, on atheism, there are no real crimes – just actions we dislike. Van Til would point out that if the New Atheist were fully consistent, he could at most say “religion does not appeal to me” or “I prefer we use scientific methods” – but he could not use morally charged language like “poison” or “evil.” The moment he uses such language, he has left the bounds of his naturalistic sandbox and is appealing to a moral reality that stands in judgment over all people (including religious ones). Such moral reality only exists if there is a moral God who created an orderly moral universe.

The “Impossibility of the Contrary” Demonstrated: New Atheism, by being so outspoken, makes the transcendental argument almost tangible. Consider the worldview Dawkins offers: a cosmos of matter and energy evolving without goal; humans are gene-propagation machines; mind and consciousness are by-products of neural complexity; when we die, we rot; there is no soul, no final accountability, no design or providence, no absolute morality – only what our genes and memes trick us into feeling. This worldview, if taken seriously, would seem to undercut every reason to trust our thinking (since it’s geared to survival, not truth) and every reason to care about anything beyond our survival or comfort (since love, duty, beauty, etc., are ultimately subjective fictions of our brains). Yet, Dawkins lives as a rational, moral, truth-seeking, beauty-appreciating being – he loves music, he cares about educating the next generation, he moralizes about truth versus deception. In practice, Dawkins cannot operate within the confines of “pitiless indifference.” He must ignore the pitiless part and smuggle in values like truth-seeking (why is it better to know truth than to live in comforting delusion, on his terms?) and compassion (why should we care for the weak, when natural selection might suggest the elimination of the weak?). The very vehemence of the New Atheists betrays that they actually do believe in some higher values – else why crusade at all? As many critics have pointed out, if they truly believed religion is a by-product of evolution, they should see it as something that cannot be blamed any more than any other natural phenomenon; yet they treat it as a moral villain to be defeated. Presuppositional apologetics seizes on this disconnect: it’s evidence that even Dawkins “knows God” in the sense of having God’s law and order evident to him (Romans 1:19, 2:15), but he “suppresses the truth” and explains it away, albeit inconsistently. In debate, Greg Bahnsen pressed atheist opponents on whether, given their materialism, they could justify universal logical laws or objective moral norms – the answer was usually to redefine these things or deny them in theory, even though in practice the atheist continued to use logic and make moral judgments (a classic case was Bahnsen’s 1985 debate with Gordon Stein, where Stein could not account for laws of logic except as societal conventions, which Bahnsen pointed out would make logical debate between two societies meaningless since each could have different “laws of logic”【30†L123-L129】). The takeaway is that New Atheism, no less than older atheisms, collapses without the Christian foundation. Its confident rhetoric actually highlights what it must tacitly assume: that the universe has intelligible order, that truth-seeking is meaningful, that some things (e.g. open-minded inquiry) are universally good and others (dogmatism, especially religious) are bad. Every one of those assumptions aligns with a theistic worldview (a rational Creator who values truth and instilled a moral compass in humans). None of those assumptions is warranted by a strictly atheistic worldview in which we are cosmic accidents. Thus, the New Atheist, despite posturing as the champion of reason against superstition, is in fact standing on a stolen platform. His rationality and morality are looted from the Christian view while he heaps scorn on the Source. Van Til would simply ask: What then is the more cogent and coherent position – the one that has to borrow and contradict itself, or the one that provides the very basis for those things? Clearly, the Christian worldview provides a precondition for the New Atheist to even present his case; the atheist’s case cannot even be made unless the Christian worldview is true (for only if a rational God made a law-governed universe and moral agents does argumentation have any meaning). This is the transcendental “proof” of God: without Him, the atheist’s words would be sound and fury signifying nothing – but since they do signify something (the atheist really is making meaningful claims), it inadvertently proves that the God he denies must exist to ground the meaningfulness of that exchange【4†L14911-L14918】.

In sum, New Atheism fails for the same fundamental reasons as prior atheism, though with less nuance. It illustrates the truth of Proverbs 26:12, “Do you see a man wise in his own eyes? There is more hope for a fool than for him.” By claiming to be wise, the New Atheists became fools in the biblical sense – their very protest against God serves to demonstrate the bankruptcy of the worldview they would put in God’s place. The “impossibility of the contrary” could not be more stark: if the New Atheist is right that God is a delusion, then ultimately reason, morals, and meaning are also delusions – but the New Atheist cannot live even a day as if his own reason and moral feelings are illusory. Only the Christian worldview allows him to use reason and morality without contradiction. Thus, even the New Atheist’s argument against God inadvertently presupposes God (because it presupposes an orderly rational reality and a meaningful moral dimension to life).

Conclusion: The Transcendental Necessity of Christianity

Across the diverse forms of atheism – from Nietzsche’s nihilism to Marx’s dialectical materialism, from Russell’s genteel humanism to Dawkins’ scientistic crusade – we have observed a unifying theme: atheism cannot furnish the preconditions for the very things that even atheists recognize as real and important. In each case, when atheistic thought is followed to its logical end, it undermines or contradicts some aspect of human experience that atheists themselves refuse to abandon: the existence of truth, the reliability of reason, the objectivity of moral values, the meaningfulness of life, or the value of human persons. This is not a series of coincidences or separate refutations, but rather the outworking of a single insight that Cornelius Van Til emphasized: created reality is intelligible only when seen in light of the triune Creator. When that light is repudiated, “darkness” necessarily follows (cf. Eph. 4:17–18) – not a literal lack of rational activity (atheists can be very rational in a narrow sense), but an ultimate darkness or futility in their thinking (their systems lead to dead-ends). The 1689 London Baptist Confession, echoing Scripture, states that even the natural revelation of God in creation is enough to leave men “without excuse”【22†L81-L88】. Our analysis has vindicated this: atheists are indeed without excuse, because the very rational and moral faculties they use to argue against God are themselves proof that God is there. As Van Til succinctly put it, the atheist is like a man made of water, in an infinitely extended sea of water, trying to climb a ladder of water (nonexistent) to escape water【30†L115-L123】. There is nowhere to go, nothing to grab, and no solidity for his ladder – unless he unwittingly uses the God-given ladder he claims doesn’t exist.

It is instructive that even some atheists have recognized the profoundly unsettling implications of denying God. Nietzsche foresaw nihilism and tried to overcome it by will; Marx tried to construct a surrogate kingdom of heaven on earth but ended in terror and disappointment; Russell conceded life’s meaninglessness yet yearned for meaning in love and knowledge; Nagel admitted a “fear of religion” because he “didn’t want the world to be like that” (i.e. with a God who might undercut intellectual autonomy). These pangs are the reverberations of suppressed truth. The Christian philosopher Augustine diagnosed the situation well over 1500 years ago: “You have made us for Yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in You.” Atheism is a restless enterprise, forever oscillating between rationalism (trying to assert human reason or morals as absolute) and irrationalism (reducing everything to chance or subjective will)【1†L23-L31】. We saw this oscillation in each thinker: a swing toward either affirming some absolute (Man’s will, Progress, Science, etc.) in place of God (that’s their rationalist idol), and a swing toward admitting chaos or arbitrariness (when pressed on where that idol gets its authority, it evaporates into “it just is” – an irrational posit). Only the Christian worldview unites rational order with meaningful freedom, moral law with grace, and the one and the many in creation, under an infinitely personal God. All non-Christian worldviews, atheism included, fragment reality and run into either total determinism (no room for meaning) or total relativism (no truth to be known) – or an incoherent mix of both.

By contrast, Christian theism provides the necessary transcendental framework in which reason, morality, science, and purpose cohere. The triune God, as described in the 1689 Confession (ch.2), is self-sufficient and the source of all being, truth, and goodness. He created a world that reflects His rationality (John 1:1–3), and He made humans in His image (Genesis 1:27) with cognitive and moral faculties designed to correspond to His creation (thus we can do science and recognize moral truth). Even in their fallenness, humans cannot erase the imprint of God’s image – they still use logic (a reflection of the Logos), still discern basic right and wrong (Romans 2:15), and still long for meaning and beauty (Ecclesiastes 3:11). Atheists, in rejecting God, end up misusing these gifts – reason becomes autonomous and ultimately self-subverting, morality becomes relative and ultimately empty, meaning is declared illusory yet smuggled back in through personal passion. The solution is not for the Christian apologist to abandon reason or morality (indeed not – we uphold true reason and true morality), but to lovingly demonstrate to the unbeliever that these things only have foundation in the God they deny. Van Til’s transcendental argument has thus been a consistent thread: we showed that without God, Nietzsche’s pronouncement leads only to despair, Marx’s utopia to tyranny, Russell’s reason to inexplicable miracle, and Dawkins’ morality to self-contradiction. In each case, the contrary (the atheistic presupposition) proved impossible – because the atheist is always living in God’s world rather than a truly godless one. As Acts 17:28 says, “in Him we live and move and have our being.” This is as true of the unbeliever as of the believer at the basic level of existence and intelligibility. The difference is that the believer recognizes his dependence on the Creator, while the unbeliever tries to pretend independence. But like a rebellious adolescent still economically dependent on his parents, the atheist cannot actually sever the dependence – he can only refuse to acknowledge it, all the while spending the “credit” (God’s gifts of mind, morals, etc.) given to him.

From a theological perspective, the failure of atheism underscores the truth of Romans 1: “Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools” (1:22). Cornelius Van Til never tired of pointing out that the unbeliever’s foolishness is not a matter of lacking education or logical ability – it is a spiritual/ethical folly, a refusal to fear the Lord (which is the beginning of knowledge). The task of presuppositional apologetics, therefore, is not only to refute the unbeliever but also to call them to repentance – to urge them to “cease their striving” (Psalm 46:10) and submit to the God who makes knowledge possible. The end goal is that the atheist may, by God’s grace, experience what 2 Corinthians 4:6 describes: “God, who said ‘Let light shine out of darkness,’ shines in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.” When that happens, all the pieces fall into place – the intellectual life finds its rightful foundation, and the moral and existential hungers of the soul find their fulfillment. No longer does one have to live in tension or inconsistency; in Christ, as the Confession also affirms, we find the “fulness of God’s wisdom” and the coherent worldview that can make sense of all aspects of life.

In closing, the comprehensive refutation of atheism offered by Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic can be summed up simply: atheism is “impossible” because nothing in this universe – not logic, not science, not ethics, not meaning – can stand on its own without the God who created and sustains the universe【4†L14911-L14918】. Atheism is an attempted intellectual robbery, and we have chased down the thief and shown that all the goods he carries (reason, morality, value) indeed have God’s name stamped on them. The Christian, by contrast, can freely and consistently embrace these goods as gifts from our Maker, using them in harmony with our faith. The transcendental argument leaves the atheist with a clear choice: continue in inconsistency (and “kick against the goads,” Acts 26:14), or reconsider his presuppositions and turn to the triune God as the only source of truth and salvation. The prayer of the apologist is that, having seen the futility of opposition, some will be granted repentance “leading to a knowledge of the truth” (2 Tim. 2:25). In the end, the Christian does not claim intellectual superiority by his own merit, but gratefully acknowledges that “by the grace of God I am what I am” (1 Cor. 15:10). Our boast is only in the Lord, whose revealed truth in Scripture and creation provides the firm foundation that every other worldview lacks. Thus, we presuppositionalists say to the atheist as lovingly as possible: your worldview has been weighed in the balances and found wanting – come to the Christ in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. 2:3), for He alone is the light of the world that dispels our darkness.

References

1. 1689 London Baptist Confession of Faith. The Baptist Confession of 1689 (A.D. 1689). See Chapter 1, Paragraph 1 (Holy Scripture)【22†L81-L88】; Chapter 5, Paragraph 1 (Divine Providence)【28†L68-L75】; Chapter 2, Paragraph 1 (God and Holy Trinity).

2. Van Til, Cornelius. A Survey of Christian Epistemology (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1969). Quotes on presuppositional method and the “impossibility of the contrary”【1†L23-L31】【4†L14911-L14918】.

3. Bahnsen, Greg L. The Impossibility of the Contrary (Powder Springs: American Vision, 1995). Compilation of Bahnsen’s lectures; see Bahnsen’s summary of the transcendental argument【30†L110-L118】 and comments on the atheist’s “borrowed capital”【30†L115-L123】【30†L123-L129】.

4. Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science (1882), sect. 125. (English trans. by W. Kaufmann, Vintage, 1974). Contains the “God is dead” parable of the madman【18†L68-L75】.

5. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil (1886). Discusses the creation of values and “will to power” as driving force【9†L632-L639】.

6. Marx, Karl. “Introduction” to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1844). Famous context for “religion is the opium of the people.” (Text available via Marxists.org【11†L42-L49】【11†L53-L60】.)

7. Russell, Bertrand. Letter to Edward H. (“Hugh”) Moorhead, Jan. 1952. Published in The Meaning of Life (ed. H. Moorhead, Chicago: 1988). Contains Russell’s quote: “Unless you assume a God, the question of life’s purpose is meaningless.”【15†L159-L163】.

8. Dawkins, Richard. River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1995). See p. 133 for Dawkins’ statement on the universe’s “pitiless indifference” (no evil, no good)【20†L87-L92】.

9. Ruse, Michael & E. O. Wilson. “The Evolution of Ethics,” New Scientist 108 (1985): 50–52. Argues that morality is an illusory adaptation with no objective grounding【9†L627-L635】.

10. Henebury, Paul (SpiritAndTruth.org). “Antitheism Presupposes Theism” (2013), online article. Discusses how atheists inevitably borrow ethics; includes the observation that “atheism cannot produce an ‘ought’ from a naturalistic ‘is.’”【8†L1-L4】【9†L632-L639】.